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COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL
FUNDAMENTALS
by Richard S. Kay*
I
If by legal theory we mean considered reflection on the nature and
sources of law, no field of law more insistently engages questions of
legal theory than constitutional law. Constitutional law regularly in-
volves the application of rules that are fundamental in the sense that
they control and authorize other law but are, themselves, neither con-
trolled nor authorized by any other law. The interpretation and elabo-
ration of those rules necessarily requires attention to the very basis of a
legal system, to the stuff that makes law law.
This aspect of a legal system is evident from the familiar regres-
sion which legal theorists make in seeking the ultimate validating
source of any rule of law. We can trace a chain of validity only so far.
In most systems once we get to the constitution we have run out of law.
When we ask what makes the constitution law we have left the uni-
verse of positive law. Whatever makes law at this level must itself be
something other than law. This pre-legal source consists of behavior
and beliefs of human beings in the society in which the relevant legal
system functions.
An informed description of any legal system requires an account
of this social origin. H.L.A. Hart posits the existence of an ultimate
"rule of recognition" that provides criteria for identifying valid law in a
legal system. This rule has a dual nature. From a point of view internal
to the legal system the rule of recognition appears as a rule of positive
law. But, since it is not validated by any other rule of law, we can
understand how it achieved its status only by considering it from a
* Professor of Law, University of Connecticut. A.B., Brandeis University: M.A., Yale Univer-
sity; J.D., Harvard University. A version of this paper was presented at a conference on Compara-
tive Legal Theory at the Department of Law, City Polytechnic of Hong Kong, January 12, 199 1. I
am grateful to the participants at that conference and to my colleague Carol Weisbrod for helpful
suggestions and criticisms.
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viewpoint external to the legal system. From that perspective we see
that it is a product of some kind of social acceptance.1 "It is," noted
H.W.R. Wade in what is still one of the most compelling expositions of
this question, "simply a political fact." 2
Usually actors in a legal system can ignore the pre-legal aspect of
the rule of recognition. The internal point of view, according to which
it appears merely as another, although superior, rule of law is adequate
to deal with most of the issues that concern legal decision-makers. Lord
Bryce thought it was possible and desirable to separate entirely the
question of the basis of legal authority from those of the identification
and application of that authority.
The question, Who is legal Sovereign? stands quite apart from
the questions, Why is he Sovereign? And Who made him sov-
ereign? The historical facts which have vested power in any
given Sovereign, as well as the moral grounds on which he is
entitled to obedience, lie outside the questions with which law
is concerned; and belong to history, or to political philosophy,
or to ethics; and nothing but confusion is caused by intruding
them into the purely legal questions of the determination of
the Sovereign and the definition of his powers.3
This is true enough in normal times." But there are occasions when
such a separation is impossible. At certain times the character of the
rule of recognition itself comes into contest and a more explicit consid-
eration of the pre-legal facts supporting it are forced to the surface.
When such a consideration is undertaken by officials of the legal sys-
tem it is likely to occur in the context of constitutional adjudication.
I intend here to survey a number of such instances. They are
drawn from various legal systems at various times (the United King-
1. See H. HART. THE CONCEPT OF LAW 111-13 (1960).
2. Wade, The Basis of Legal Sovereignty, [1 9551 C.L.J. 172, 189. See also Kay, Preconstitu-
tional Rules, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 187 (1981). This ultimate fact or rule of recognition is sometimes
misleadingly called a rule of common law. See e.g. W. J. JENNINGS, THE LAW AND THE CONSTI-
TUTION 156-63 (5th ed. 1959); Dixon, The Common Law as an Ultimate Constitutional Founda-
tion. 31 AUSTRL. L.J. 240 (1957); Slattery, The Independence of Canada, 5 SuP.CT. L. REv. 369,
379-81 (1983). Wade has shown that, if it is, it is unique since it is unalterable by any action of
the law-makers whose authority it created. See Wade, supra at 187-88; C. MUNRO. STUDIES IN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 103-04 (1987). A similar notion is that of the Basic Norm propounded by
Hans Kelsen. See H. KELSEN. THE PURE THEORY OF LAW 46-48, 194-200 (1967).
3. K. WHEARE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE COMMONWEALTH 109 (1960 re-
printed 1982) (quoting 2 BRYCE. STUDIES IN HISTORY AND JURISPRUDENCE).
4. But see infra note 104.
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dom, Ireland, the United States, Hong Kong, the Philippines, Rhodesia
(now Zimbabwe) and Canada) although all share a link to the common
law system of England. The presence of such cases in such a variety of
times and places reinforces the inference that the problems occasioning
such judgments are general. They all arise from an ineluctable common
central fact - social and political change. The pre-legal sources on
which law is built will, like any social phenomena, change over time.
These changes will make themselves felt in the interpretation and ap-
plication of rules of positive law.
It is an understandable instinct in judges to dress their considera-
tion of such questions in the attire of ordinary, law. 5 When the changes
at issue are moderate and gradual this will be a plausible approach. On
the other hand, when political and social change is drastic and abrupt,
we can expect judicial inquiry to be more overt. But subtle or dramatic,
hidden or revealed, every judgment of constitutional law - indeed
every judgment of law - rests on an explicit or implicit finding on the
source of legal authority.
II
The association of constitutional law adjudication with an exami-
nation of constitutional fundamentals requires a consideration of what
we mean by the term "constitutional law." Similarly, our definition of
"constitutional law" requires a prior definition of "constitution." At
this point we run into a difficulty: the term "constitution" does not
mean the same thing in every legal system. In most legal systems it
refers to a single, entrenched, written set of constitutional rules. A sig-
nificant exception, however, is the legal system of the United Kingdom
where no such document exists.' In the United Kingdom the word
"constitution" refers, more generally, to "the body of rules and ar-
rangements concerning the government of the country."17 Those "rules
5. See Dias, Legal Politics: Norms Behind the Grundnorm, 26 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 233, 233
(1968).
6. The United Kingdom is now almost unique in this regard. The New Zealand Parliament
achieved full and unrestrained law-making power in this century. See Joseph, Foundations of the
Constitution, 4 CANT. L. REV. 58 (1989). It is sometimes said that Israel has no written constitu-
tion but it does have some Basic Laws that are unchangeable by ordinary legislative action. BASIC
LAW: KNESSET, ss. 44,45 reproduced in 8 A. BLAUSTEIN & G. FLANZ. CONSTITUTIONS OF THE
COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 18 (1988).
7. C. MUNRO, supra note 2, at I. See also J. ALDER, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW 3 (1989) (The constitution is "the basic framework of rules about the government of [the]
country and about its fundamental values.").
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and arrangements" have many sources and appear in many forms.
They include rules of law embodied in charters and statutes, as well as
in court decisions. They also include non-legal traditions and under-
standings that vary in specificity and venerability.'
These two different meanings of "constitution" lead to two differ-
ent definitions of "constitutional law." In the United States, and in
other countries with similar constitutions, constitutional law is the law
of the constitution. It consists of the application of the rules of the
constitution in the operation of the agencies of public power as well in
the adjudication of disputes about the proper use of that power. It in-
cludes, therefore, not merely the written rules but also the elaboration
of those rules by public officials, most significantly by the judges, in the
decision of cases.
In the British tradition, on the other hand, the nature of the "con-
stitution" precludes such a straightforward definition. There is no sin-
gle constitutional text to serve as the sole source of constitutional law.
The constitution is created in many ways, occupies various levels in the
hierarchy of law, and is applied or interpreted by different actors on
different occasions. Constitutional law is defined then not by its source
but by its subject. It is that law "which regulate[s] the structure of the
principal organs of government and their relationship to each other and
to the citizen and determine[s] their main functions." 9 In this sense, it
is a category like family law or agricultural law. This also accounts for
the affinity, almost amounting to identity, of British constitutional law
and administrative law,10 two subjects more clearly, if still imperfectly
distinguished in American law."
Once we have identified these two different conceptions of consti-
tutional law it may be appropriate to ask whether the association of
constitutional law with questions of constitutional fundamentals holds
in the United Kingdom, as well as in countries with a single entrenched
constitution. The controversies that raise these inquiries will be those
that challenge the propriety of the actions of the state. These cases will
take the form of issues of constitutional law in the British system as
8. See E. WADE & A. BRADLEY. CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 12-24 (1985).
It should be noted that certain American legal realists also preferred to use the term "constitu-
tion" in this "British" sense. See Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 COLUM. L.
REV. 1 (1934).
9. E. WADE & A. BRADLEY, supra, note 8, at 9.
10. See id. at 10. See also J. ALDER, supra note 7, at 6 ("Administrative law is an aspect of
constitutional law.")
II. See B. SCHWARTZ. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 3 (1984).
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well as in the more typical regime where they are premised on the writ-
ten constitution. Put more generally, the availability of the legal system
as a forum for the determination of disputes over public power will
sometimes require an investigation of the extent to which the state is
governed by law. But since the legal system is itself a product of the
state, such an investigation will tend towards a consideration of the
nature of legal authority.
III
In fact, from one perspective, these theoretical questions might
emerge more readily under the British model of constitution and consti-
tutional law. That is because there has been no attempt in that system
to reduce the understanding of fundamental legal authority to rules of
positive law. Under a written constitution the extent of state power can,
in the first instance, be ascertained by the ordinary judicial process of
construction of a legal enactment. The response to a challenge to gov-
ernment action in the United Kingdom, on the other hand, more
quickly runs out of positive law to consult. Justification of state power,
then, requires the consideration of, or at least citation of, the political
postulates that underlie official authority. Thus English judges have re-
sponded to challenges to the validity of acts of Parliament not by citing
some legal authority for the rule of parliamentary supremacy, but by
putting it forward as an axiom of the legal system:
What the statute itself enacts cannot be unlawful, because
what the statute says is itself the law, and the highest form of
law that is known to this country. It is the law which prevails
over every other form of law, and it is not for the court to say
that a parliamentary enactment, the highest law in this coun-
try, is illegal.12
This language faithfully reflects the doctrine of parliamentary
supremacy which has been, for more than two hundred years, dogma in
British law. Dicey called this "the dominant characteristic of [British]
political institutions" and said it means that Parliament has "the right
to make or unmake any law whatever and, further, that no person or
body is recognized by the law of England as having a right to override
or set aside the legislation of Parliament."' 3 What this comes down to
12. Cheney v. Conn, [19681 1 All E.R. 779, 782 (Ct. App. Ch. Div.).
13. A. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 3-4 (8th ed.
1915, reprinted 1982).
1991 ]
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is a social and political understanding that final legal authority is prop-
erly vested in a joint decision-maker consisting of the monarch, House
of Lords and House of Commons, and that such authority is subject to
no legal restraint of any kind."' This allocation of legal power is usually
thought to have emerged from the political settlement following the
Glorious Revolution of 1688.15
We can note, however, two arguments that have caused British
courts to examine more critically this underlying political judgment.
The first, based on the Acts of Union of 1707, relies on the claimed
existence of a positive law restraint on parliamentary discretion. It thus
directs judges to a different and subsequent historic moment when the
legal system's character is supposed to have been defined. The second,
based on the United Kingdom's membership in the European Commu-
nity, assumes the appearance of a new rule of recognition at a third
and even later date.
In the Acts of Union of 1707 the Parliaments of England and
Scotland effected the political union of those countries and the creation
of the United Kingdom.16 At the same time, they created the Parlia-
ment of the United Kingdom and expressly prohibited that body from
passing certain legislation. Both litigants and academic commentators
have argued that these provisions constitute legal limits on Parliament's
law-making power. Strictly as a matter of positive law reasoning this
argument is irresistible. 17 Yet, although claims of this kind have been
brought on several occasions to Scottish courts and sometimes received
sympathetically, 8 they have never sufficed to decide a case.
It was impossible for courts to reject these arguments without
making implicit judgments on the pre-legal source of legal authority in
the United Kingdom. To be sure, the judgments did not address the
matter in these terms. Rather the judges tended to narrow the issue so
as to focus on the powers of the judiciary. In particular, they some-
times doubted the right of courts to examine the existence of a conflict
between legislation and the terms of the Union. (In addition, the Scot-
14. See Allan, The Limits of Parliamentary Sovereignty, [1985] PUB. LAW 614, 615. It has
been suggested that this assumption entails a political preference for "some irreducible, minimum
concept of the democratic principle." Id. at 620.
15. See J. ALDER, supra note 7, at 10-12.
16. Union with Scotland Act, 1706, 6 Ann. c. I1; Union with England Act, 1706, A.P.S. XI,
c. 7.
17. See e.g. Upton, Marriage Vows of the Elephant: The Constitution of 1707, 105 LAW
QUARTERLY REv. 79 (1989).
18. MacCormick v. Lord Advocate, 1953 Sess. Cas. 396 (First Division).
[Vol. 6:445
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tish courts considering such questions have always offered their opinion
that no conflict existed).1 9 More to the point, they have averred that
even in the face of a presumed conflict the judiciary has no authority to
treat a statute as ineffective. 20
Whatever the form of the judgments, to the extent they enforced
legislation at odds with the Union, these courts had to found the au-
thority of Parliament on something other than the conventional under-
standing of the facts of its creation in 1707. Perhaps the lawmaking
power of Parliament is instead based on some pre-existing right in the
English Parliament and it is that Parliament that survived the union or
that passed its powers on to the new Parliament.2 Perhaps political
events and attitudes subsequent to the union vested unlimited law-mak-
ing authority in the Westminster Parliament.2 We cannot be sure from
the opinions expressed exactly what these judges believed was the legit-
imating source of parliamentary authority. But we can know they re-
jected one entirely plausible possibility.
A very similar kind of question arises with respect to the effect of
the membership of the United Kingdom in the European Communities.
This is a matter that is receiving active scholarly attention and has
begun to percolate its way through the British courts. The issue, simply
put, is whether Parliament may legislate in a way that conflicts with
properly promulgated European Community law. The United Kingdom
acceded to the treaties creating the European Communities in 1973.23
Those treaties, as interpreted by the European Court of Justice, require
that Community law prevail over any inconsistent national law. 4 The
1972 British implementing legislation, moreover, provides that "any en-
actment passed or to be passed . . . shall be construed and shall have
19. See Fraser v. MacCorquodale, 1990 Inner House Cas. (Court of Session, Inner House 24
July 1990)(challenging levy of "poll tax" in Scotland); Murray v. Community Charges Registra-
tion Officer, 1990 Inner House Cas. (Court of Session, Inner House 24 July 1990)(same); Gibson
v. Lord Advocate 1975 Sess. Cas. 136 (Outer House) (challenging legislation enabling member-
ship in European Communities); MacCormick v. Lord Advocate, 1953 Sess. Cas. 255 (First Divi-
sion) (challenging use of numeral "I1" in royal title of Queen Elizabeth).
20. See cases cited supra note 19. Two judges reserved judgment as to the justiciability of
challenges to legislation which would abolish the Church of Scotland or the Court of Session. See
Gibson v. Lord Advocate, 1975 Sess. Cas. 136 (Lord Keith); MacCormick v. Lord Advocate,
1953 Sess. Cas. 396 (Lord President Cooper).
21. See 5 STAIR MEMORIAL ENCYCLOPEDIA: THE LAW OF SCOTLAND 153-54, Constitutional
Law, 351 (T. Smith ed. 1987).
22. See id. at 153.
23. See M. JANis, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 217 (1988).
24. See id. at 227-28 (discussing Costa v. Ente Nazionale per L'Energia Elettrica, 1964 Com-
mon Market L. Rep. 425).
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effect subject to" the law of the Communities. 5 Based solely on these
legal authorities, it would appear that no legislation that conflicted with
Community rights or obligations could, to that extent, "have effect."
That is indeed the position to which the courts of the United King-
dom appear, quietly and obliquely, to have come. The problem in
reaching this conclusion was not acute insofar as it concerned legisla-
tion enacted before the effective date of the 1972 act. That act could be
seen as impliedly repealing or amending any prior legislation insofar as
it was inconsistent with the European law adopted by the statute.26
Such a result is perfectly consistent with the orthodox view of parlia-
mentary sovereignty.
Conflicting legislation enacted after 1972 poses a much more seri-
ous issue. To the extent a court would hold such a statute ineffective it
could do so for one of two reasons. First, it may be that by virtue of the
provisions I have cited of the European Communities Act, 1972, enact-
ments "to be passed" are subject to European law. But that is to say
that the Parliament of 1972 may limit the legislative authority of sub-
sequent Parliaments. That would be to abandon a basic corollary of the
doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, that no Parliament may bind its
successors.17 Second, it may be that upon the United Kingdom joining
the European Communities it introduced into its legal system a new
and superior organ of law-making power to which the old law-giver was
subordinate. Either of these rationales, therefore, would mark recogni-
tion of a new definition of the source of legal authority in the United
Kingdom.2 8
The initial and natural approach of the British courts to this diffi-
culty was to avoid it. Whenever and however possible, they attempted
to construe the domestic law as consistent with the relevant European
law.29 This required a relaxation of those English rules of statutory in-
terpretation whereby a court was confined to the plain words of legisla-
tion without consideration of the underlying purpose of Parliament
(which was, in these cases, presumed to be to act consistently with the
25. European Communities Act, 1972, § 2(4).
26. See C. MUNRO, supra note 2, at 129.
27. A. DiCEy, supra note 13, at 21-25.
28. The constitutional difficulties associated with Britain's membership in the European Com-
munities are discussed in Bradley, The Sovereignty of Parliament - in Perpetuity? in THE
CHANGING CONSTITUTION 25, 37-43 (J. Jowell and D. Oliver eds. 1989).
29. The ability of the British courts to construe European law so as to avoid conflicts was
much more limited. The European Communities Act, 1972 s.3(l) made the interpretation of such
law by the European Court conclusive in United Kingdom law.
[Vol. 6:445
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treaties.) 30 This effort required greater and greater judicial liberality
with the domestic statutes. In a much cited dictum Lord Diplock sug-
gested the possibility that nothing
short of an express positive statement in an Act of Parliament
passed after January 1, 1973, that a particular provision is in-
tended to be made in breach of an obligation assumed by the
United Kingdom under a Community treaty would justify an
English court in construing the provision in a manner inconsis-
tent with a community treaty obligation of the United King-
dom, however wide a departure from the prima facie meaning
of the statute might be needed in order to achieve
consistency.31
In a recent judgment unanimously agreed to in the House of
Lords, Lord Bridge restated this rule of "interpretation" in even more
extreme terms. He stated that the 1972 Act "had precisely the same
effect as if a section were incorporated in [every subsequent statute]
which in terms enacted that [its provisions] were to be without
prejudice to the directly enforceable Community rights of nationals of
any member state."32 If this language still refers to a rule of interpreta-
tion we have reached a "point [where 'interpretation'] becomes ficti-
tious and political reality is better represented by obeying the Commu-
nity rule and admitting that the English rule is inconsistent. ' 3 Indeed
in his reasons for judgment in a subsequent phase of the same litigation
Lord Bridge stated his view more bluntly:
Under the terms of the Act of 1972 it has always been clear
that it was the duty of a United Kingdom court, when deliver-
ing a final judgment, to override any rule of national law
30. See e.g. Pickstone v. Freemans plc, [1989] I A.C. 66.
31. Garland v. British Rail Engineering Ltd., [19831 2 A.C. 751, 771. It is important to note,
however, that Lord Diplock offered this supposition only after stating that this was a question
which "the instant appeal does not present an appropriate occasion to consider." Id.
32. Factortame Ltd. v. Secretary of State for Transport, [1989] 2 All E.R. 692, 701. See
Editorial, Interim Relief Against the Crown, 15 EUR. L. REV. 281, 282 (1990) ("The House of
Lords... acknowledged that it had the power and duty to give priority to provisions of community
law over conflicting national legislation.")
33. J. ALDER. supra note 7, at 97. On the relation of interpretation to substantive limitation,
see Allan, supra note 13, at 616-18. It is possible that by means of such devices as purposive
interpretation or restrained discretion, a divergence between the formal positive rules and the
actual substantive decision-making power can be maintained for a substantial length of time. Oc-
casionally, however, circumstances force a confrontation in which the incongruity must be dealt
with. See infra text, at notes 79-101.
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found to be in conflict with any directly enforceable rule of
Community law."
The language of this dictum is especially telling. "Overriding" is ex-
actly what Dicey said "no person or body" had the right to do to an act
of Parliament."'
Whether we have a rule calling for overt invalidation or an explicit
canon requiring that we invariably construe laws as consistent with
those of the European Community, the result is the same. In some
cases, at least, Parliament is, as a matter of law, no longer free to legis-
late exactly as it chooses; in some cases the courts are to disregard the
best, the most honest, estimate of the will of Parliament. 6 Parliament
in such a regime, is no longer the supreme law maker.37
I am not here concerned so much with the results of either line of
cases I have discussed, as with the kinds of questions the courts were
posed. When, as in these cases, constitutional law adjudication calls on
the courts to determine the extent to which Parliament may or may not
legislate contrary to the acts of Union or to European Community law,
it necessarily demands that they make judgments as to the pre-legal
facts that determine what makes valid law. "When we ask what Parlia-
ment can or cannot do, we are going to the very root of the legal sys-
34. R. v. Secretary of State for Transport ex parte Factortame Ltd. (1990) 3 W.L.R. 818,
(1990) Common Market L. Rep. 375 (11 October, 1990). To be perfectly precise, it must be
pointed out that the subject of both of these judgments was the availability of interim relief.
pending a reference to the European Court, to parties who challenged the operation of a 1988
statute as inconsistent with Community rights. The quoted statement of Lord Bridge in the 1989
judgment referred to the relation of Community law to the underlying statute. His referent in the
1990 judgment is more general but might be understood as confined to the effect of European law
on the English law concerning interim relief against the Crown and that law might be understood
as pre-dating the 1972 Act.
35. See supra text, at note 13.
36. It has been suggested that these new limitations do not go so far as to prevent Parliament
from either repealing the 1972 Act in its entirety or from making an express statement that the
relevant legislation is to operate in contravention of European law. Even such a restriction on the
mere form of legislation, however, represents an encroachment on the total sovereignty of Parlia-
ment (at least as it has often been understood) and opens the door for far more sweeping "manner
and form" restrictions. See C. MUNRO, supra note 2, at 97-102. Numerous commentators have
noted that the development of a rule of the supremacy of European law would involve the emer-
gence of a new basic norm or rule of recognition. See, e.g. de Smith, The Constitution and the
Common Market: A Tentative Appraisal 34 MOD. L. REV. 597, 613-14 (1972); Winterton, The
British Grundnorm: Parliamentary Supremacy Re-examined 92 L. Q. REV. 591,613-17 (1976).
37. Cf. Allan, note 14, at 618-19. I refer here to a situation in which an otherwise informal
rule of interpretation has been adopted as an explicit rule of law. In such a case we can say that
legal as well as political sovereignty has been transformed. See A. DiCEY, supra note 13, at 27-35.
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tem, and in that proximity legal theory depends on political fact." 38
Conversely, if we are interested in the underlying political premises of
the British legal system, we can look no place else than to these kinds
of decisions of constitutional law.
IV
Such more or less immediate recourse to the fundamentals of the
legal system might seem to arise less naturally in the more common
case where there is an identifiable written positive law constitution. In
such a case the nature of legal authority is presumably set out in the
discrete constitutional document which is itself a legal enactment and
is to be construed in the same way as any other such enactment .3 But
the fact of a written positive law constitution cannot eliminate the need
for recourse to constitutional fundamentals. Rather, such a fact merely
takes the inquiry back one step. In interpreting and applying the writ-
ten constitution it will, on occasion, be necessary to consider what the
constitution is, or, put another way, what makes it law.
A good example of this kind of investigation by judges is presented
by a disagreement in the 1930's over the nature of the constitution of
the Irish Free State. The existence of that state was the immediate
product of a period of armed rebellion in Ireland in the years 1919-21.
The Irish nationalists had established a governmental structure for an
independent Irish republic, including an elected legislature, the Dail
Eireann. Negotiations between representatives of that government and
those of the United Kingdom resulted in the Anglo-Irish Treaty of
1921 providing for extensive self-government for the southern part of
Ireland. The agreement specified that the new Irish regime would have
status and powers similar to those of other self-governing dominions in
the British Commonwealth such as Canada and Australia. The Dail
Eireann thereupon declared itself a "constituent assembly" and enacted
a Constituent Act giving force of law to a constitution scheduled to the
act. That constitution conformed to the requirements of the Treaty.
The United Kingdom Parliament then enacted the Irish Free State
Constitution Act, 1922 declaring the same constitution effective as the
38. C. MUNRO, supra note 2, at 71. The common questions involved in the Union and the
joining of the European Communities are noted and discussed in Mitchell, What Happened to the
Constitution on Ist January 1973, 11 CAMBRIAN LI. 69 (1980).
39. Subject, of course, to possible special rules of construction appropriate to the general and
long term nature of such enactments. See, e.g. Edwards v. Attorney-General (Can.), [1930] A.C.
124, 136 (P.C.); M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 406-07 (1819).
1991.]
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constitution of the Irish Free State. °
An interpretation of these events was called for in two cases de-
cided in 1934 and 1935 in the Irish Supreme Court and in the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council.4 1 The particular issue was whether
the Irish Free State Parliament, the Oireachtas, could amend the Free
State constitution so as to contravene the terms of the Anglo-Irish
Treaty of 1921.
In Moore v. Attorney-General 2 the Judicial Committee decided
that it could. Its reasoning was as follows: Article 50 of the constitution
providing for constitutional amendments limited such revisions to those
"within the terms of the Scheduled Treaty." In 1933, however, the Oi-
reachtas, enacted, in proper form, an amendment to the constitution -
Act No. 6, The Constitution (Removal of Oath) Act - deleting the
quoted language from Article 50 thus opening the door to amendments
of any kind. The 1933 amendment was itself permissible because in
1931 the United Kingdom Parliament had enacted the Statute of
Westminster granting to "Dominions" the right to legislate in ways
that contravened acts of the Parliament of the United Kingdom. Arti-
cle 50 of the constitution had the force of law only because of the en-
actment by the Parliament at Westminster of the Irish Free State Con-
stitution Act 1922, ratifying the action of the Dail in promulgating the
constitution. Thus, as a result of the Statute of Westminster, the
Orieachtas was not constrained by the 1922 Imperial act nor by Article
50, which was merely derivative of that act.
The courts of the Irish Free State never passed on the validity of
Act. No. 6 of 1933, removing the treaty-based limits on the amending
power. But, in dicta in a case decided about six months before the
Moore case dealing with the validity of another amendment of the con-
stitution, Justice FitzGibbon of the Irish Supreme Court declared that
"an amendment of Article 50 by the deletion of the words 'within the
terms of the Scheduled Treaty' would be totally ineffective."'4 3 Justice
FitzGibbon's reasoning differed from the Judicial Committee's in one
40. See J. CASEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN IRELAND 4-10 (1987).
41. This question and these cases are discussed in K. WHEARE. supra note 3, at 89-94.
42. [1935] A.C. 484, (1935) I.R. 472.
43. The State (Ryan) v. Lennon, [1935] I.R. 170, 227. Justice FitzGibbon's statement al-
though not necessary to the decision of the case under review was by no means hypothetical since
Act No. 6 of 1933 which attempted to do exactly this had been enacted 18 months before. While
the dissenting judgment of Chief Justice Kennedy and the concurring judgment of Justice
Murnaghan do not speak directly to the point, each is consistent with a similar conclusion. See id.
at 209-14 (opinion of Kennedy, C.J.); See id. at 241 (opinion of Murnaghan, J.).
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crucial respect. For him the force of Article 50 (and its limitation on
the power of amendment) did not depend in any way. on some enact-
ment of the Parliament of the United Kingdom. It was, therefore, im-
mune to any revising power created by the Statute of Westminster.
Article 50, like the whole constitution, depended for its authority solely
on the Constituent Act, the only legislation of Dial Eireann'sitting as a
constituent assembly, "represent[ing] the inhabitants of Saorstat Eire-
ann" acting "in accordance with the doctrines of popular sover-
eignty." '44 That being the case, no authority that did not equally re-
present the sovereign people could dispense with the limitations the
people put on the amending power, certainly not the Parliament of the
United Kingdom.
On the surface these two judicial expressions present something of
a paradox. It is the British court that holds that the Irish legislature is
free to adjust its constitutional arrangements as it sees fit." The indige-
nous Irish court appears prepared to limit the powers of the Oireachtas.
But these different conclusions are the result of two profoundly differ-
ent conceptions of the nature of Irish law, each based on a different
view of who has the power to make law in Ireland. The Privy Council
founded the unrestricted amending power of the Oireachtas on the
Statute of Westminster. Since that statute was an enactment of the
Imperial parliament, the sweeping power it conferred was a conse-
quence of the will of a foreign authority. Not surprisingly, that Court
saw all Irish law as emanating from the power granted by the United
Kingdom Parliament. The underlying source of law for it was the illim-
itable power of the King-in-Parliament. This conception of the basis of
Irish law was naturally unacceptable to the Irish courts. The Statute of
Westminster was, for them, an irrelevancy. For these judges there was
no law higher than the constitution, and the constitution included Arti-
cle 50 with its limitations. Therefore no mere legal agency could
change it. The constitution's status as supreme law was established by
an autochthonous legal process, one that rested on Irish will alone."
This difference over the essential character of the Free State con-
stitution was possible because of the parallel forms of enactment.
Strictly as a matter of positive law argument, either result was per-
fectly defensible. It was, in part, this possibility that inspired the par-
ticular form of constitutional change adopted in Ireland in 1937. The
44. Id. at 224-27.
45. See J. KELLY. THE IRISH CONSTITUTION 2 (2d. ed. 1984).
46. See K. WHEARE, supra note 3, at 92-93.
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government of the day expressly refused to promulgate the new consti-
tution by enactment of the Dail (the only surviving house of the Oi-
reachtas). Rather, in carefully chosen words, the Dail merely "ap-
proved" a draft of the constitution; only in a popular referendum was it
"enacted. '4 7 This was an intentional and explicit break with the law-
making authority of the 1922 constitution and, as such, it was necessa-
rily also a break with the authorization of that constitution at West-
minster. Article 1 of the 1937 Constitution states that "[t]he Irish na-
tion hereby affirm its inalienable, indefeasible and sovereign right to
choose its own form of government. . .. -48The forms of law were in-
tentionally designed to mirror the prevailing view as to the source of
law-making authority.
The confusion engendered by the presence of two antecedent legal
enactments creates an initial obstacle to officials or other observers who
wish to understand the fundamental assumptions that support a legal
system. In the case of Ireland in 1934 and 1935 the availability of the
two legal explanations of the constitution, in a way, forced the courts
beyond the positive law artifacts to consider and to articulate the
source of the pre-legal constituent authority. This example shows that
it is not enough merely to identify what H.L.A. Hart called a "relation-
ship of validating purport" between two rules of law. Such a relation-
ship may mask the actual social processes that legitimate a law-making
authority.49
47. See id. at 94-95; J. KELLY, supra note 45, at 3-4.
48. Id. at 8 (quoting IRISH CONST. OF 1937, art I).
Of course it would have been possible for the United Kingdom Parliament to re-enact the
1937 Constitution thus reproducing the original problem. This is, after all, what it did in 1922
after the Third Dail Eireann had passed the Constituent Act expressly declaring that it was "sit-
ting as a Constituent Assembly . ..and in the exercise of undoubted right." Quoted in K.
WHEARE, supra note 3, at 90. In fact the British law did not respond to the new Irish constitu-
tional situation until 1949. Irish legislation in 1948 explicitly abolished any role for the monarch
in the Irish state. With this development the British authorities felt Ireland could no longer re-
main part of the Commonwealth (although this has not been an insuperable problem for the
membership of subsequent republics). The Westminster Parliament then enacted the Ireland Act
of 1949 explicitly stating that the King's authority no longer extended to Ireland. See id. at 152-
56. In contrast to its actions in 1922 this may be seen as a decision to allow the legal forms to
follow political realities. Of course, that act might itself be treated as some kind of authorization
for Irish law making. See infra text, at notes 71-72 concerning the Hong Kong Act, 1985.
A similar "unauthorized" procedure for establishing an autochthonous constitution has been
suggested for Australia. See Moshinsky, Re-enacting the Constitution in an Australian Act, 18
FED. L. REV. 134, 149 (1989).
49. See H. HART, Kelsen's Doctrine of the Unity of Law in ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND
PHILOSOPHY 309, 318-21 (1983). To take an extreme case, it was only 1964 that the United
Kingdom Parliament repealed the American Colonies Act, 1766 (Declaratory Act) asserting the
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V
The same kind of issue, therefore, is 'bound to arise even when
there is an uncontested hierarchy of positive law rules as in the consti-
tutional system of the United States. This is especially likely in the
period when a constitutional-political regime is settling into place. The
easy assumptions judges and other officials may make about the politi-
cal principles underlying a legal system will, at such times, be less obvi-
ous. Indeed several examples of adjudication early in American consti-
tutional history show a willingness to consider the fundamental
character of the new legal dispensation. Naturally these examinations
arose in the course of construing the Constitution itself. But the words
of the document alone could not resolve the questions put before the
courts by litigators. To understand the meaning of the Constitution it
was necessary to take account of the political convictions that had suc-
ceeded when the legal system governed by the Constitution had been
created.
Most prominent in this regard is the case of Marbury v.
Madison5" which first applied the authority of the courts to declare
legislation invalid if it conflicted with the Constitution. Chief Justice
Marshall's argument for judicial review is well known: The courts must
decide cases according to the law. When confronted with two applica-
ble but conflicting laws, they must choose the superior law over the
inferior. Consequently, the rule of the Constitution must be honored
and that of a conflicting statute ignored.5 1
The argument depends, however, on the assumption that the Con-
stitution is the same kind of law that is ordinarily applied by the courts
- that it is, in fact, the supreme rule of, and in, the legal system. But
that conclusion is not inevitable. It is not illogical to conceive of a writ-
ten constitution that is not itself enforceable in the courts of law. 2
That is indeed the case in a number of countries including, for exam-
ple, the Netherlands and Switzerland. 53 Moreover this view could not,
sovereign legislative authority of the United Kingdom over the territory that now constitutes the
United States. See S. DE SMITH. CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 77, note 8 (5th ed.
H. Street & R. Brazier eds. 1981). If we just consider the relationship of validating purport we
could conclude that the legal authority of American law since 1964 is a consequence of that
parliamentary action.
50. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
51. Id. at 177-78.
52. See Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE L.J. I, 17-20, 25.
53. See K. WHEARE, MODERN CONSTITUTIONS 101,103-04 (2d ed. 1966). In Switzerland the
federal courts may review the constitutionality of cantonal but not federal legislation. Id. at 101.
19911
CONNECTICUT JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW
logically, be derived from the Constitution itself, as Marshall tried to
do, since it was the very nature of that document's authority that was
in question. The result in Marbury must, therefore, rest on a controver-
sial assumption about the nature of the legal system established by the
creators of the Constitution. In fact, Marshall's decision makes this
plain. He. asserts that judicial review follows from a "theory ... essen-
tially attached to a written constitution ... [and] one of the fundamen-
tal principles of our society."'5 4 That theory expresses a preference for a
state limited in advance by abstract rules applied by the courts. "The
fundamental principles of [a] society," of course, are not the products
of the law. They determine what the law is.
A similar recourse to the fundamental characteristics of the legal
system was necessary when the Supreme Court first had to elaborate
on the nature of the federal system created by the Constitution. In two
critical early cases the relative powers of the state and federal govern-
ments were put into issue. While, in form, these issues merely con-
cerned the proper construction of the constitutional text, they really
turned on a judgment as to the kind of thing the Constitution was, and
on an assumption as to what made the Constitution law.
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee55 was the first case in which the United
States Supreme Court explicitly upheld its own appellate jurisdiction
over the courts of the various states. Justice Story's opinion for the
court was, for the most part, a straightforward interpretation of Article
III of the Constitution, insofar as that provision defines the jurisdiction
of the federal courts in general, and the Supreme Court in particular.
But the nub of the argument of Virginia in resisting the authority of
the national judiciary was premised on a far more basic point: It simply
was not in the nature of the government established by the Constitution
that the states, themselves, could be subject to direct national author-
ity. This immunity of the states, one advocate argued, was apparent
from "[t]he whole scheme of the constitution." The court could exer-
cise no power "inconsistent with the whole genius, spirit and tenor of
the constitution. '" 56 Another lawyer for the same side made plain that
he saw the court necessarily straying into the most sensitive questions
of constitutional politics: "The taper of judicial discord may become
the torch of civil war, and though the breath of a judge can extinguish
54. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) at 177.
55. 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 304 (1816).
56. Id. at 316 (argument of Tucker).
[Vol. 6:445
FUNDAMENTALS
the first, the wisdom of a statesman may not quench the latter. 5
The judgment of the Supreme Court in no way avoided this di-
mension of the issue. Justice Story saw fit, before offering his more
familiar legal analysis, to "dispose of some preliminary considerations."
He thought it important to deal with the idea that the states were in
some way the creators of the Constitution and they were, therefore,
somehow immune from any control or correction by their creature, the
federal government. He cited the preamble to the Constitution to affirm
that the Constitution was not the handiwork of the states but of the
"people of the United States." The people in making the Constitution
could treat the powers of the states as they chose, subordinating them
to their more general objectives in creating the national government.
"The constitution was not, therefore, necessarily carved out of existing
state sovereignties, nor a surrender of powers already existing in state
institutions ... .,,58
The same issue was raised three years later in the great case of
M'Culloch v. Maryland.59 The precise question was the vulnerability of
the Bank of the United States, a creation of the national Congress, to
taxation by the states. Once again the litigants and the Court saw the
issue as turning, in part, on the correct characterization of the associa-
tion of states and national government created by the constitution. The
argument of the Bank that it was immune from state taxation required
two significant implications from the Constitution: first that the Con-
gress possessed a wide discretion in choosing the means for executing
the limited number of express powers granted to it and; second, that
the states were disabled from exercising their governmental powers in
ways that interfered with the activities of the federal government.
Chief Justice Marshall plainly understood that the issue was
whether or not the Constitution was the empowerment of a strong na-
tional government independent of the states. The alternative was that it
would be a mere delegate of the separate sovereignties of the states.
The text of the Constitution was far from conclusive on these questions.
What were needed were some presumptions as to how to read its grants
and prohibitions. To deduce these it was necessary to inquire as to
what, in a broad political sense, the enactment of the Constitution had
done.
To a very significant extent, issue was joined on exactly this ques-
57. Id. at 320 (argument of Dexter).
58. Id. at 325.
59. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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tion. Walter Jones, arguing for the state, "insisted that the constitution
was formed and adopted, not by the people of the United States at
large, but by the people of the respective States .. . .It is, therefore, a
compact between the States, and all the powers which are not expressly
relinquished by it are reserved to the States."60 The contrary position
was put just as directly. In his argument for the Bank, William
Pinkney claimed that the Constitution:
springs from the people . . . .The state sovereignties are not
the authors of the constitution of the United States. They are
preceding in point of time, to the national sovereignty, but
they are postponed to it in point of supremacy, by the will of
the people. The means of giving efficacy to the sovereign au-
thorities vested by the people in the national government, are
those adapted to the end .... They must be supreme, or they
would be nothing.61
Before considering the specific issues in contest, Chief Justice
Marshall, in his unanimous opinion of the Court, responded to the con-
troversy as to the basic nature of the Constitution:
[C]ounsel for the State of Maryland have deemed it of some
importance, in the construction of the constitution, to consider
that instrument not as emanating from the people, but as the
act of sovereign and independent States. The powers of the
general government, it has been said, are delegated by the
States, who alone are truly sovereign; and must be exercised in
subordination to the States, who alone possess supreme
dominion.6 2
This view of the constituent process, he firmly rejected. He emphasized
that the Constitution was ratified not by state governments but by spe-
cial conventions. Therefore
[t]he government proceeds directly from the people .. . . To
the formation of a league, such as was the confederation, the
State sovereignties were certainly competent. But when, "in
60. Id. at 363.
61. ld. at 377-78.
62. Id. at 402. Marshall here overstated the position of counsel who envisioned limited sover-
eignty in each level of government with resolution of conflicts left to restraint and accommodation.
See id. at 370-71. His characterization, however, is true to the political outcome such a position
entailed.
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order to form a more perfect union," it was deemed necessary
to change this alliance into an effective government, possessing
great and sovereign powers, and acting directly on the people,
the necessity of referring it to the people, and of deriving its
powers directly from them, was felt and acknowledged by
all.13
Since the powers of the national government do not derive from the
states but from the people, those powers are to be interpreted in a way
liberal enough to accomplish the people's objects in conferring them.
The people declared the laws enacted in pursuance of those objects to
be supreme. "Consequently, the people of a single State cannot confer
a sovereignty which will extend over [such laws]. '"6
It is worth noting that this exegesis did not succeed in settling the
question of the nature of the Constitution's federal system. For almost
another fifty years the contention that the Constitution was a mere
compact of states and that the states retained the ultimate authority to
determine the extent of federal power, was a vital, persistent and gnaw-
ing strain in American political discourse.65 It took its most extreme
form in the attempted secession of the Southern states, acts which were
defended, at least in part, by reference to principles of state sovereignty
which were still claimed to underlie the very constitution to be dis-
solved."6 The unacceptability of this interpretation was determined, at
the end, not by legal decision but by civil war. Even then, however, we
may find the coda to that dispute in a judicial opinion concerning the
legitimacy of acts of one of the rebellious governments. The Constitu-
tion, the Supreme Court declared, created "an indestructible Union,
composed of indestructible States." 7
63. Id. at 403-04.
64. Id. at 429. See also id. at 432.
65. See H. HYMAN & W. WIECEK. EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOP-
MENT 1835-1875, 211-14 (1982).
66. See id. at 210-15.
67. Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 725 (1868). Even after the Civil War the idea that
the states retained some irreducible power to determine for themselves the nature of the national
constitutional arrangements remained a significant although increasingly marginal theme in
American political discourse.
As recently as 1981 President Reagan in his first inaugural address claimed that -[all] of us
need to be reminded that the Federal Government did not create the States; the States created the
Federal Government." Ronald Reagan's Inaugural Address, PUB. PAPERS (January 20, 1981).
The right of state officials to differ from and resist the constitutional interpretations of the
Supreme Court was definitively rejected in Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. I, 18 (1958).
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VI
It is impossible to discuss these kinds of questions in this sympo-
sium without noting, at least in general and tentative terms, their possi-
ble application to the future constitutional status of Hong Kong. If
events proceed as is now most likely, twenty or thirty years from now
Hong Kong will be a Special Administrative Region of the People's
Republic of China. It will be governed immediately by the terms of the
Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. The
meaning of the terms of that Basic Law are already the subject of con-
siderable discussion especially with respect to the right authoritatively
to interpret its provisions.6 If such issues become matters of judicial
controversy their resolution will call for the same kind of investigation
as the cases we have examined. The proper construction of the Basic
Law depends on what kind of an instrument it is thought to be. For
that it will be necessary to know on what prelegal basis the Basic Law
rests - what makes the Basic Law law.
As in some of those other cases, however, we cannot specify a sin-
gle regression through a series of validating acts of positive law which
will unfailingly lead to the basis of the Hong Kong legal system. There
are a number of possibilities. One simple analysis would proceed as
follows: The Basic Law is an act of the National People's Congress.
The power of the Congress to enact that law is provided in Article 31
of the 1982 Chinese constitution. 9 That constitution sets forth in Arti-
cle 1 that it is the product of a political resolve to establish "a socialist
state under the people's democratic dictatorship led by the working
class and based on the alliance of workers and peasants.1 70 Another
68. See Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region arts. 2, II, 82, 158; M.
DAVIS, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFRONTATION IN HONG KONG: ISSUES AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE
BASIC LAW 16-22, 42-46 (1990); Special Report: 'Basic Law'for Governance of Hong Kong Seen
as Crucial To Role As Commercial Power, 7 INTERNATIONAL TRADE REPORTER 1716 (1990);
Ho, Autonomy, in THE BASIC LAW AND HONG KONG'S FUTURE 296-98 (P. Wesley-Smith & A.
Chen eds. 1988); Jones, A Leg to Stand On? Post-1997 Hong Kong Courts as a Constraint on
PRC Abridgment of Individual Rights and Local Autonomy, in LAW IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC
OF CHINA 918, 922-23 (R. Folsom & J. Minan eds. 1989).
69. See Ho, supra note 68, at 294-95.
70. CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA art.l. See also LAW IN THE PEO-
PLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, supra note 68, at 22 ("The Preamble to the 1982 Constitution identi-
fies the four principles on which the People's Republic of China is based. They are socialism, the
people's democratic dictatorship, Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong thought, and the leadership
of the Communist Party of China...."). Commentators have argued that the very idea of a
"constitution" in China is profoundly different from the Western conception, reflecting not long-
term principles but transitory policies. See M. DAVIS, supra note 68, at 18-22; Jones, The Consti-
tution of the People's Republic of China in LAW IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, supra
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plausible explanation would be as follows: The Basic Law is law be-
cause the authority to legislate for Hong Kong after July 1, 1997 was
ceded by the United Kingdom Parliament in the Hong Kong Act,
1985. 1' That legislative cession was possible because of the plenary au-
thority of Parliament "to make or unmake any law whatever. '7 The
social and political universes out of which these two possible sources of
authority emerged are certainly very different and depending on which
is selected we can expect the Basic Law to be read very differently. 71
It is plain that there is no way to choose between these alternatives
simply as a matter of positive law analysis. Each exhibits a "relation-
ship of validating purport ' 7 and the choice will turn on the pre-legal
factors that support the legal system as a whole. For the same reason,
these two explanations need not exhaust the possibilities. The Basic
Law might come to be understood as legitimated by neither Chinese
nor British law but by the Joint Declaration of 1984 in which both
China and the United Kingdom agreed on the 1997 transition and pro-
vided that Hong Kong would enjoy a "high degree of autonomy" and
that its "social and economic system" and "life-style" should remain
unchanged for 50 years.75 Looked at this way the authority of the Basic
Law would be founded in the international law of treaties and its inter-
pretation would be influenced by that tradition.70 Or, perhaps over an
extended period of time and with a satisfactory course of adjudication,
the Basic Law might come to be accepted in Hong Kong (and China
generally) as authoritative in its own right, simply because it is so re-
garded. It would then be an autochthonous constitution, one that has
struck a local root.77
There are sure to be other possibilities and the prospects are com-
plicated by the interaction of at least three legal systems. It is simply
impossible to say now what the underlying justifications for the existing
constitutional order will be then. These questions are necessarily tem-
poral. They can be answered only with reference to attitudes and values
note 68, at 39, 49.
71. Hong Kong Act, 1985, § 1(1).
72. A. DICEY, supra note 13, at 3.
73. See M. DAVIS, supra note 68, at 18-22; Kuan, Chinese Constitutional Practice, in THE
BASIc LAw AND HONG KONG'S FUTURE 55 (P. Wesley-Smith & A. Chen eds. 1980).
74. Hart, supra note 49, at 318-21.
75. Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and North-
ern Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Question of Hong
Kong, para. 3 (2), (5).
76. See M. JANIS. supra note 23, at 23-34.
77. See K. WHEARE, supra note 3, at 89.
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at a given point in time. The fact of change is central to any considera-
tion of constitutional fundamentals. The very same positive law rules
may be supported by different pre-legal considerations at different
times. 78 Our judgments as to the future understanding of the Basic
Law can be only speculation. The constitutional law of Hong Kong,
however, like every constitutional law, will sooner or later have to come
face to face with its own fundamental character and history.
VII
Since it is the inevitability of change in the prevailing political val-
ues of a society that occasions the need for reconsideration of the basis
of law, we can expect these reexaminations to occur, in their most ex-
plicit form, at moments of crisis. It is by no means accidental that so
many of the cases I have discussed occurred in the course of fundamen-
tal political transitions in the states involved. In normal times the fun-
damental positive laws of a legal system suffice to decide almost any
matter that comes before the courts. The presuppositions which give
those rules force are taken for granted and they shape the understand-
ing and application of the constitutional rules silently and invisibly. In
contrast are those unusual periods when, for whatever reasons, there is
widespread and openly expressed doubt about the essential nature and
powers of the state and legal system. In such circumstances a misalign-
ment may develop between the emerging political principles and the
positive law that concerns the reach of state power - that is, constitu-
tional law. Courts asked to apply the rules of positive law at such times
will find themselves looking at the familiar constitutional rules in a
more critical and self-conscious way. That is exactly what happened in
many of the cases mentioned.
There are a number of different ways a court might respond on
such occasions. It might, of course, simply insist on applying the old
rules in the old way, that is, as if the former presuppositions on which
the law was based still were effective. 79 That is a straight road to irrele-
78. For example, the British North America Act, 1867, Canada's constitution may have been
law in 1875 by virtue of attitudes about the authority of the Imperial Parliament. It was still
regarded as binding law in 1982 but certainly for different" reasons. See Slattery, supra note 2, at
398-99. It has been suggested that the same phenomenon has occurred in Australia. See Moshin-
sky, supra note 48, at 134, 136 (1989). See generally K. OLIVECRONA. LAw As FACT 103 (2d ed.
1971).
79. An alternative not discussed in text is resignation. This was the course followed by some
Rhodesian judges. See Dias, supra note 5, at 233. Similarly, a majority of the judges in Fiji
resigned after a military coup. See Moshinsky, supra note 48, at 149 n.74. This is more the
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vancy at best, and, at worst, to mortal danger. While the relationship
of influence between law and the political consensus is not all one-way,
in the long run, as I have noted, it is political beliefs that make law. 80
Therefore it will fall to a court (if it is to survive as a court) to bring
the law into conformity with the political reality.
Sometimes a change in the foundations of the legal system is par-
ticularly clear and dramatic. On such occasions the judicial system, if
it is permitted to continue in its old form, need do little more than
recognize the transformation of the constitutional regime. Furthermore,
given the obviousness and the apparent irreversibility of the change,
there is little reason for a court to fail to acknowledge, as well, its ex-
tra-legal character. This was the case following the "people power"
revolution in the Republic of the Philippines in February, 1986. On
February 14 the National Assembly had certified President Ferdinand
Marcos to be the winner of a presidential election held on February 7.
That result was generally believed to be fraudulent, the true winner
having been Marcos' principal opponent, Corazon Aquino. On Febru-
ary 25, following massive public demonstrations and a military revolt,
Marcos left the country and Aquino took office as "President." Clearly
she did not take that position as it was defined and regulated in existing
law. On March 25 President Aquino put into effect, by proclamation, a
provisional constitution which, inter alia, abolished the National As-
sembly."' An appointed constitutional commission prepared a draft of a
proposed new permanent constitution that was approved in a plebiscite
on February 2, 1987 and became effective on that date. 2
The Supreme Court of the Philippines (All Marcos appointees had
resigned at the request of President Aquino on March 13, 198683) was
soon confronted with cases questioning the authority of the Aquino
government. Its response was perfectly direct. It appeared in a judg-
ment delivered in October, 1986 in an action that sought a declaration
as to the meaning of a provision of the proposed new constitution refer-
decision of an individual than the response of a court.
80. This is not to say that legal rules and decisions do not themselves influence political be-
liefs. See Kay, Moral Knowledge and Constitutional Adjudication, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1501, 1511
(1989); Weisbrod, On the Expressive Functions of Family Law, .22 U. CAL. DAvIs L. REV. 991
(1989). The circumstances discussed in text are assumed, by hypothesis, to involve a significant
divergence between the relevant political consensus, however formed, and the positive rules of
constitutional law.
81. See Flanz, "Philippine Supplement, 1984-86" in 14 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES
OF THE WORLD 3-10 (A. Blaustein & G. Flanz eds. 1986).
82. DeLeon v. Esguerra, 153 S.C.R.A. 602 (1987).
83. See Flanz, supra note 81, at 5.
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ring to the "term of the incumbent President and Vice-President
elected in the February 7, 1986 election." Did this provision, the peti-
tioner asked, mean Aquino or Marcos? The Court made no bones
about the legitimacy, if not the legality, of the new system:
In previous cases, the legitimacy of the government of Presi-
dent Corazon C. Aquino was likewise sought to be questioned
with the claim that it was not established pursuant to the 1973
Constitution. The said cases were dismissed outright by this
court which held that:
'Petitioners have no personality to sue and their petitions state
no cause of action. For the legitimacy of the Aquino govern-
ment is not a justiciable matter. It belongs to the realm of
politics where only the people of the Philippines are the judge.
And the people have made the judgment; they have accepted
the government of President Corazon C. Aquino which is in
effective control of the entire country so that it is not merely a
de facto government but in fact and law a de jure govern-
ment. Moreover the community of nations has recognized the
legitimacy of the present government. All the eleven members
of this court, as reorganized, have sworn to uphold the funda-
mental law of the Republic under her government.'84
In other situations, however, things may not be so clear. Two other
cases illustrate some of the difficulties and dangers. In the first, occur-
ring in Canada in 1980-82, the change in constitutional fundamentals
was unaccompanied by any breach of positive law. In the second, in
Rhodesia in 1965-68, an obvious attempt had been made to break with
existing law but the efficacy of the new legal system was more doubt-
ful. In both these cases, moreover, the courts were called on to make
far more complicated and, therefore, far riskier estimates of the nature
of the underlying political change.
The Canadian adjudication arose in connection with a legal dis-
pute surrounding the adoption of the Constitution Act 1982. Before
that event the power to amend the Canadian constitution had, in signif-
icant measure, rested in the Westminster Parliament acting, by conven-
84. In Re: Saturnino v. Bermudez, 145 S.C.R.A. 160, 163 (1986) (citing Joint Resolution of
May 22, 1986 in G.R. No. 73748 [Lawyers League for a Better Philippines, etc. v. President
Corazon C. Aquino, et al.); G.R. No. 73972 [People's Crusade for the Supremacy of the Constitu-
tion, etc. v. Mrs. Cory Aquino, et al.]; and G.R. 73990 [Councilor Clifton U. Ganay v. Corazon
C. Aquino, et a].]).
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tion, on the advice of Canadian officials. In 1980 the Canadian federal
government announced its plan to request such an amendment for the
purpose of securing a domestic amending procedure and also creating a
constitutionally entrenched charter of rights. Significantly, it planned
to take this action without the consent of the provincial governments
whose unanimous consent had, in the past, been secured before amend-
ments of this kind were initiated. Eight provinces objected to this
course of action."5
The federal-provincial dispute took, in part, the form of a lawsuit,
a reference to the Supreme Court of Canada. The critical part of the
Court's judgment responded to the provinces' claim that the power to
seek a constitutional amendment of this kind was governed by a consti-
tutional convention. Such a convention imposes a politically, but not
legally, binding standard of behavior on public officials.8" A majority of
the Supreme Court held there was such a convention and it inhibited a
federal request for an amendment affecting the relative powers of the
federal and provincial governments without some, unquantified, mea-
sure of provincial assent.87 In a subsequent reference it clarified the
convention, holding that the minimum provincial assent did not, of ne-
cessity, have to include that of the government of Quebec.88 While the
finding of such a convention was, by definition, of no legal effect, as a
practical matter it forced the federal government to come to a new
agreement with nine of the ten provinces (excluding Quebec).89
The Court's decision, while in the form of a mere inquiry into the
existence of a constitutional convention, really consisted of an examina-
tion of the pre-legal understandings that constituted the final law-mak-
ing authority in the Canadian polity. The "convention" elaborated was
about the right to create and to change the constitution, the law that
controlled every other rule of positive law in the legal system. This in-
vestigation was made necessary by the fact that the fundamental politi-
cal assumptions about authority in society had changed but those
changes had not been reflected in the positive constitutional rules of the
legal system. At Canada's creation in 1867 the ultimate source of law
was the Imperial Parliament. By 1980 it was evident that the final legal
85. See Kay, Constitution-Making In Canada, 24 WORLDVIEW 21 (1981).
86. See e.g., C. MUNRO, supra note 2, at 35-60.
87. Re: Resolution to Amend the Constitution (Patriation Reference), 11981] I S.C.R. 753,
875, 910.
88. Re: Objection By Quebec To A Resolution to Amend the Constitution (Quebec Veto Ref-
erence) [19821 2 S.C.R. 793. See text at note 102 infra.
89. See N. WARD, DAWSON's GOVERNMENT OF CANADA 300-02 (1987).
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authority was Canadian and that it resided in some combination of pro-
vincial and federal elected officials. But this transition had never been
crystallized into a definition. The constitutional program of the federal
government forced an explicit examination of that question.9" The
Court's judgment focused overtly on the history and traditions of Ca-
nada as an independent state. Since the new political assumptions ar-
ticulated by the Court only affected the way in which official actors
should exercise admitted legal power, those officials were able to give
effect to these fundamental changes without a breach of the positive
rules of law.'
Such a peaceful and law-clad revolution, of course, is not always
possible. In Canada it was viable because the positive law rules were
broad enough to permit the kind of governmental power that the politi-
cal imperatives required. Moreover, the governmental actors, the fed-
eral government and the United Kingdom government, were willing to
restrict the exercise of the powers afforded them by positive law in or-
der to conform with the now recognized political limitations. When, as
the Philippines case illustrates, either of these elements is missing, the
tension between the pre-legal understandings and the positive law rules
may become unsustainable. In such a case a revolutionary breach of
law becomes inevitable. Successful judicial accommodation to the fact
of change will then ordinarily require a recognition of both the new
political assumptions and of the break in legal continuity.
Such change occurred in what was then called Southern Rhodesia
following the Unilateral Declaration of Independence and proclamation
of a new constitution by the Ian Smith regime in 1965. These actions
were plainly in conflict with the existing positive constitutional rules
that had been enacted by the Westminster Parliament in 1961. The
continuing validity of British authority was confirmed by that Parlia-
ment in the Southern Rhodesia Act, 1965 and in the Privy Council's
judgment in Madzimbamuto v. Lardner-Burke in 1968.92 There were,
therefore, two competing sets of assumptions about what made legiti-
mate law. in Southern Rhodesia. One was premised on the final author-
ity of the United Kingdom Queen in Parliament and the other on the
90. See generally Kay, Courts as Constitution-makers in Canada and the United States, 4
SuP. CT. L. REV. 23 (1982).
91. "ILlegal rules create wide powers, discretions and rights which conventions prescribe
should be exercised only in a certain limited manner, if at all." Re: Resolution to Amend the
Constitution, (Patriation Reference) [1981] I S.C.R. 753, 881.
92. [1969] I A.C. 645. See generally E. WADE & A. BRADLtEY, supra note 8, at 430-32.
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will of the white minority population of Rhodesia as reflected in the
actions of their elected representatives in the Smith government. These
two views of political authority had yielded two different and conflict-
ing regimes of positive law. Officials of each regime were intentionally
acting in ways that prevented the operation of the other. It was, there-
fore, impossible to reconcile the authority of the Smith government
with British colonial authority by reformulating either the contesting
rules of law or the political principles.
Since the effective government in Rhodesia had left in place the
judicial institutions of the old system, it was inevitable that the judges
should come to confront questions about the legality of the actions of
the new order.9" This occurred in a number of cases94 culminating in R.
v. Ndhlovu95 decided in the Appellate Division of the Rhodesian High
Court in 1968. The collision of regimes was direct. The appellants had
been indicted for violation of a public order measure enacted by the
Rhodesian Legislative Assembly in 1967. By an Order in Council is-
sued pursuant to the Southern Rhodesia Act, 1965 the United King-
dom authorities had expressly declared that legislature had no power to
make law. The appellants challenged the validity of the indictments.
Unlike the situation in the Philippines where the efficacy of the
political change was unmistakable, the refusal of British authorities to
acknowledge the new government, its continuing efforts to resume con-
trol, and significant internal opposition all made the nature of the polit-
ical basis of the legal system in Rhodesia highly problematic. Never-
theless, the judges of the Appellate Division unanimously held that the
local "usurping" government had acquired the status of a de jure gov-
ernment and that it was its laws and not those of the United Kingdom
that the court would follow.
As in the Philippine and Canadian judgments, the Rhodesian
judges' inquiries were explicitly empirical. Whether revolutionary insti-
tutions in a society had achieved the right to make law depended on the
"efficacy of the change." I have referred to the complex of pre-legal
attitudes that create the law-making authority. This court implicitly
found such attitudes to support the legitimacy of the local government
93. On the judicial responses to the Rhodesian crisis see generally Dias, supra note 5: Palley,
Comment, 1968 PUBLIC LAW 293; Eekelaar, Rhodesia, The Abdication of Constitutionalism, 32
MOD. L. REV. 19 (1969).
94. Madzimbamuto v. Lardner-Burke [1968] 2 S.A. 284, rev'd [1969] I A.C. 645; Dhlamini
v. Carter [1968] 2 S.A. 464.
95. [1968] 4 S.A. 515.
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by finding that it was effectively in control and likely to remain so.
Chief Justice Beadle finally placed most of his emphasis on the ineffec-
tiveness of the economic sanctions that Britain was employing in an
effort to bring the Smith government down. "The real question," he
asserted, is "[w]hat effect will sanctions have on the political temper of
the people?" He examined export figures, tax revenues, the results of
parliamentary by-elections, and the routine character of government
operations and concluded that the government is "more firmly in the
saddle than ever before." 96 The polemical judgment of Macdonald,
J.A. drew a distinction between "constitutional reality [and] abstract
legal theory."97 That reality was affected by what he termed the British
government's "waging ...economic war against its own subjects" in
order to bring the Rhodesian people "to a state of revolt against their
elected representatives." 98 But the result, he claimed, was the opposite.
By its actions the United Kingdom "forfeit[ed] not only respect and
authority but also all claim to allegiance." 99
The Rhodesian people in consequence were left with a choice
between two Governments: first a Rhodesian Government in
Britain created by the enactments of 16th November, 1965
and making no attempt to govern but, on the contrary, waging
economic war: secondly, an elected Rhodesian government the
Cabinet of which had illegally declared independence and had
been dismissed but which had continued in office and was con-
tinuing to govern. . . Not surprisingly the Rhodesian people
in the main continued to support the Government in Rhodesia
and this Government has, in consequence, now attained full de
jure status.100
96. Id. at 531.
97. Id. at 552.
98. Id. at 547.
99. Id. at 549.
100. Id. at 553-54. It is obvious, of course, that this court's reference to the political attitudes
of "the Rhodesian people" was an extremely narrow and artificial one. A legal system rests on the
attitudes and beliefs of those human beings whose acquiescence can be translated into effective
political power. At the time of these judgments that probably meant the white minority. Over the
long run, as events disclosed, the convictions of the whole population became critical. See text at
note 101 infra.
Two other much discussed cases in which courts decided the legal status of revolutionary
governments are Uganda v. Commissioner of Prisons, (1966] E.A. 514 (Uganda) and State v.
Dosso, [1958] 2 P.S.C.R. 180 (Pakistan). In Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849) the
United States Supreme Court refused to adjudicate the question of which of two contenders was
the lawful government of Rhode Island, deferring to the judgment of the legislative and executive
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The backgrounds against which the Philippine, Canadian and
Rhodesian cases were decided were very different but they presented an
important common element. The Canadian court dealt with what it
presumed to be a stable and widely shared political consensus that had
peacefully evolved over a long period of time without any breach of
positive law. The Philippine and Rhodesian judges confronted a dis-
crete shift in political authority effected by an explicitly unlawful act.
But in each case the inquiry was essentially historical and sociological.
It required a description of the actual, changed, pre-legal state of af-
fairs that had developed in each society. From that finding it was possi-
ble to infer the character of the legal system that was viable there.
The Canadian and Rhodesian cases also illustrate another una-
voidable aspect of the kind of adjudication under discussion. Since they
do not involve a conclusive interpretation of accepted legal rules but
are, instead, based on an estimate of social and political reality, they
are necessarily temporal and tentative. The Philippine court could, by
virtue of the strong national approval of the extra-legal changes, recog-
nize the new system with some confidence in its efficacy and stability.
The underlying facts in Canada and Rhodesia were substantially
more complicated. This is evident from subsequent events in each coun-
try. The hard facts of world disapproval and civil war made the inde-
pendent Rhodesian legal system untenable. Although the transition to
an independent legal system in Zimbabwe was dressed up with formal
accoutrements of enactment in the United Kingdom, 101 the authority of
that system was in no substantive way based on the law-making au-
thority of the Westminster Parliament. Rather it was founded on a
workable political consensus in the territory which it governed. The
story in Canada is not yet complete but the Supreme Court's judgment
that final constituent authority existed in the federal government and
some number of provincial governments that might not include Quebec
is, at least, in serious doubt. The constitutional settlement that followed
the court's decision was opposed by the government of Quebec. The
"Meech Lake Accord" in which that province's concerns were to be
met by a series of constitutional amendments failed passage at the elev-
enth hour. Very serious questions are now being expressed about the
viability of the Canadian confederation. The movement for an indepen-
branches of the national government. This does not mean the American courts have never looked
to the pre-legal fundamentals of the legal system. See text at notes 50-67 supra.
101. See E. WADE & A. BRADLEY, supra note 8, at 430-33.
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dent Quebec state is developing a possibly irreversible momentum. 102
Should new and different countries and legal systems emerge from this
process, we will have another case of social and political realities out-
stripping the artifacts of positive constitutional law.
VIII
The political change that is at the heart of the problem I have
been examining might well be referred to as revolutionary even if it
involves no tumult or bloodshed. That is because it demands a new
definition of legal authority. There is a presumptive antinomy between
the notions of law and revolution. But as the judicial material I have
canvassed illustrates, there is also a necessary affinity between these
two concepts. In advanced societies we cannot imagine a political
change so profound as to sweep away all law. Even in the very course
of revolution, the great bulk of everyday transactions continue based on
the presumed continuity of some legal rules and the availability of in-
stitutions and procedures to vindicate legal rights. It is perhaps pa-
thetic, but also telling, that before announcing his judgment on the le-
gality of the very regime of which his court was a part, Chief Justice
Beadle in the Ndhlovu case complained that the question of law in that
case had been reserved "in terms of sec. 37 of the High Court Act, 22
of 1964" but it "should more properly have been reserved under sec.
36."103
The momentous questions we have seen courts address needed to
be asked because the ultimate bases of those continuing legal proceed-
ings and institutions were, at those times, matters of active doubt. But
even in more normal times all law must trace its authority to some
social facts. As I have noted, the connection between constitutional law,
however defined, and those basic facts is especially close. The political
consensus that supports the law at any given moment is, moreover, like
102. See, e.g. Quebec Premier Under Pressure as Referendum Calls Grow, Reuters, March
29, 1991 (LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt File); Quebec Struggles to Find New Role, N.Y. Times,
July 3, 1990, at A6, col.]; Mulroney Seeks Debate on Future of Canada, Wash. Post, Nov. 2,
1990 at A29.
The apparent failure of the Supreme Court's intervention in 1981 has not dulled some
Canadians' preference for judicial resolution of the country's constitutional fundamentals. For ex-
ample, it has been urged that a new constitution be instituted by some combination of constituent
assembly and referendum. Since neither device is allowable under the existing constitutional
amendment procedure, it has been suggested that the Supreme Court be asked to certify that such
popular approval could override the positive constitutional law. See How Will Nation Negotiate
Future Role of Quebec?, Toronto Star, Feb. 3, 1991 at A2.
103. [19681 4 S.A. at 516.
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any social phenomenon traceable to some beginning, either to some
"founding" historical events or to some less explicit turn in the prevail-
ing political climate.' In either case such a beginning might properly
be called a revolution. Consequently every legal event is, in that sense,
an extension of revolution.
104. See Joseph, supra note 6, at 59-60 ("The mantle of legal continuity may be confounding,
but it is no bar to a 'new' order transcending an 'old' . . . ")
While it is impossible to address it completely, I should, at least, take note here of one rather
basic objection to the analysis I have put forward. That is the contention that all instances of
adjudication involve recourse to the social "pre-legal" factors I have mentioned. Social facts may
well be determinative insofar as they provide the predicate for the application of accepted legal
rules. Moreover, as mentioned in text, the pre-legal facts that support the legal system, may, in
that sense, be said to influence every decision invoking that system's rules. But, I believe, relatively
autonomous systems of law can, and do, exist, for extended periods of time and it is that relative
autonomy, and the relative immunity from fundamental reconsideration of the law that it entails,
that allows law to provide the stability and predictability that are its peculiar contribution to
social well-being. I thus see the law as, most of the time, being analogous to what T.S. Kuhn
called "normal science." See T. KUHN. THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION (1962). This
should not be obscured by the inevitable and fascinating, but relatively unusual, moments of "par-
adigm shift" that are the focus of this paper.
1991]

